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Abstract 
This article seeks to contribute to the debate on how to devise an appropriate legal framework for 
foreign bank operations. It considers the implications of the corporate form of foreign bank opera-
tions and examines how countries can protect domestic financial systems effectively from the det-
rimental effects of cross-border failures. To this end, it critically reviews the various mechanisms 
and tools applied in a number of jurisdictions.  
JEL classification: G21, G28. 
Why should countries open their domestic financial sector to competition from foreign-owned finan-
cial institutions? It is now widely recognized that this is an effective way to make local financial sys-
tems more effective and efficient (CGFS, 2004). The entry of new institutions adds depth to the local 
financial system and gives domestic companies a wider choice of services and borrowing options. 
Also, they bring new techniques and expertise into the local market. Indeed, foreign entry through 
direct investment is widely recommended by researchers and analysts as a means of strengthening 
weak and inefficient banking structures, particularly in emerging economies (e.g., Claessens, 2006).  
Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Member States are required to accord to 
services and service suppliers of other Member States treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to like domestic services and service suppliers (national treatment)1. The GATS does not define mar-
ket access. Instead, it lists six categories of measures that are prohibited unless specified in a coun-
try’s schedule. These cover limitations on the number of service suppliers, on the value of service 
transactions or assets, on service operations or output, on the number of natural persons employed, 
on the type of legal entity, and on the permissible scale of the participation of foreign capital. How-
ever, the Annex on Financial Services contains an important carve-out. This so-called “prudential 
carve-out” permits measures taken for reasons of safety and soundness to ensure a financial system’s 
integrity, subject to the proviso that such measures not in conformity with the GATS “shall not be 
used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement”. A 
dispute settlement procedure is foreseen to resolve conflicting interpretations. The scope and charac-
ter of prudential measures permitted under the “carve-out” of the Annex on Financial Services are 
not specified in the GATS, and there is clearly a need for clarification. The prudential exception must 
be assessed in light of the two purposes defined by the prudential carve-out: (1) the protection of 
depositors, and (2) ensuring the integrity and stability of the financial system.  
The question is whether any national provisions relating to the corporate or organisational form of 
foreign banks that are different from those applying to their domestic counterparts, could be con-
strued as constituting a violation of national-treatment.  
Banks operating across borders can easily transfer losses from one country to another. In case of 
distress, a parent company could attempt to transfer good assets out of one country to itself or sub-
sidiaries in other countries. The host country would in this case then bear the costs of a crisis that 
originated in another country (e.g., Hull, 2002). To reduce the potential burden on local taxpayers 
(and voters!) a country may choose to adopt special rules that provide for the protection of domestic 
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stakeholders’ interests by way of ring fencing of a foreign bank’s domestic operations and other 
means, which will be further discussed in this article. 
Foreign bank presence can take a variety of forms, ranging from the acquisition of domestic insti-
tutions with extensive branch networks to the establishment of isolated representative offices or 
operations across borders without a physical or legal presence (e-banking). However, only 
branches and subsidiaries book transactions and hold assets or liabilities. They are therefore most 
relevant from the perspective of safety and soundness.  
Branches and subsidiaries – how different are they? 
Branches are an extension of the parent bank, not a separate legal entity. Subsidiaries are separate 
legal entities. They have their own local capital base and their own local boards of directors.  
Branches and subsidiaries typically involve different levels of parent bank responsibility and fi-
nancial support. Subsidiaries are separate legal entities. By contrast, in the case of branches, parent 
banks are, in principle, responsible for their liabilities.  
In practice, the distinction between branches and subsidiaries is much more subtle (Cerrutti et al., 
2005). As markets and institutions become global, business decisions increasingly disregard legal 
and jurisdictional boundaries. Global financial institutions increasingby concentrate their manage-
rial decision points in fewer places. In the case of risk management policies, financial institutions 
often measure their exposure to different risk factors on a global basis, consolidating all their posi-
tions, disregarding where these positions are booked. At the same time, global institutions increas-
ingly book certain types of positions, like derivatives, in “hubs”, to exert better control and to take 
advantage of economies of scale and friendlier regulatory environments. Some financial groups, as 
observed in Cardenas et al. (2003), are looking to consolidate all credit country risks in the country 
of origin. As a result, subsidiaries of such a bank may experience wider fluctuations in their profits 
and losses. The parent may, but in principle has no obligation to use gains in one entity to cover 
losses in another1. In good times, the distinction between branch and subsidiary may not matter 
because a banking group may be managed and treated by the market as a single economic entity. 
However, it appears that in times of stress, the differences between subsidiary and branch struc-
tures will matter.  
Uncertain parent support 
From the perspective of the host country concerned about the stability of the domestic financial 
system and the safety of domestic depositors’ savings, the distinction between branches and sub-
sidiaries and the legal framework under which they operate is of paramount importance.  
If losses occur in a bank’s home country operation, this can lead to the bank’s retrenchment from 
foreign operations and cause the parent to abandon its foreign establishments. Unfavourable condi-
tions in the host country and dim prospects of continued profitable banking may cause a retrench-
ment of foreign banks in a host country. As such, during the Argentine crisis, some foreign banks 
abandoned their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina, and depositors were not able to make 
claims against the foreign parent (Del Negro and Kay, 2002).. Where the foreign bank’s operations 
are significant, this can have an important effect on the stability of the host country’s financial 
system. Such a situation can be found in Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and also New 
Zealand. Pursuant to Caviglia et al. (2002) foreign investors own more than two-thirds of the 
banking system in accession Countries.  Foreign ownership implies an effective control of over 
more than one-half out of the roughly 300 commercial banks in the region and is heavily geared 
towards the larger institutions.  
                                                          
1 See infra note 3 on the “source-of-strength” principle. 
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Thus, the question arises whether or not and under what circumstances a parent company can be 
held liable for the obligations of its subsidiaries and branches. In the case of branches and agen-
cies, the head office is in principle fully liable. In the case of subsidiaries there is, in principle, no 
legal obligation. Yet, there seem to be exceptions to those general rules:  
(1) Under some circumstances, a foreign parent may be willing assure the solvency of 
the subsidiary in order to maintain its reputation. In fact, Argentinean depositors 
filed a legal dispute in Spain against the Spanish bank BBVA in order to recover de-
posits booked in Argentina given that “[s]ome of the success of global banks in at-
tracting deposits derived precisely from the fact they marketed themselves as being 
‘safer’ than local banks because they have the backing of the parent company” (Del 
Negro and Kay, 2002, p. 10).  
(2) Under US law, there is a requirement that a holding company assists its bank sub-
sidiaries in case of a crisis. Under the so-called “source-of-strength” principle in US 
law, a holding company must act as a source-of-strength to its subsidiary banks. “A 
bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to 
its subsidiary banks and shall not conduct its operations in an unsafe or unsound 
manner.” 12 C.F.R. § 225.4. “A bank holding company's failure to meet its obligation 
to serve as a source of strength to its subsidiary bank(s), including an unwillingness 
to provide appropriate assistance to a troubled or failing bank, will generally be 
considered an unsafe and unsound banking practice…”1 It is noteworthy that this 
provision seems to apply only to domestic subsidiaries. 
(3) Support from the parent bank to its foreign subsidiaries should, however, not be 
taken as granted. A decision to support a subsidiary will be made solely in light of 
expected future profits and losses and expected reputational cost. The existence of fi-
nancial agreements between parent companies and their subsidiaries in the form of 
“comfort letters” should not be considered as an incontrovertible source of strength 
since their enforceability in times of stress is untested.  
(4) In order to limit reputation costs of abandoning a subsidiary, some internationally ac-
tive banks may consider using different brand names. But this needs to be balanced 
against the marketing gains associated with the use of a single name for different le-
gal entities. Different banks reach different conclusions, but the use of a common 
name is widespread. For example, after the merger of UBS with Paine Webber and 
Warburg, the firm undertook a marketing campaign to create a unified global brand.  
(5) While a bank should in principle be considered liable for all its branches’ obligations, 
ring-fencing provisions in home country laws may limit such obligations. As a result, 
banks may not be required to honour the obligations of a foreign branch in conditions 
where the branch faces repayment problems resulting from extreme conditions or 
events (such as war or civil conflict) or owing to certain actions by the host govern-
ment (e.g., exchange controls, expropriations, etc.). For instance, in the case of U.S. 
bank branches section 25C of the Federal Reserve Act establishes that “a member 
bank shall not be required to repay any deposit made at a foreign branch of the bank 
if the branch cannot repay the deposit due to an act of war, insurrection, or civil 
strife or (2) an action by a foreign government or instrumentality (whether de jure or 
de facto) in the country in which the branch is located, unless the member bank has 
expressly agreed in writing to repay the deposit under those circumstances”.  
(6) This provision was introduced following the Philippine payment moratorium of 1983 
(McCauley et al., 2002). A Singapore subsidiary of one US bank had placed a dollar 
deposit with another US bank’s branch in Manila. After the Philippine government 
                                                          
1 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 52 Fed. Reg. 15707, April 30, 1987. 31 32 
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imposed a moratorium on the repayment of such deposits, the depositor bank sued 
the other US bank in American courts for repayment in the United States. The Su-
preme Court ultimately found in favour of the plaintiff, arguing that the deposit con-
tract did not explicitly prevent the repayment in New York. US law was subsequently 
amended so that, in the event of a moratorium, payment would be required in the 
United States only if the contract explicitly called for repayment in such circum-
stances1.  
(7) Another example of a provision limiting the liability of the head office is found in the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement. It stipu-
lates that the headquarters will bear no responsibility for transactions made at over-
seas branches in the case of exchange controls or expropriation (see ISDA (2003), 
Section 10 (a) Ring-Fencing Agreements).  
Foreign bank branches: asset maintenance, asset pledges, endowment (dotage) 
capital  
Some jurisdictions impose asset pledge or asset maintenance requirements in order to assure that 
sufficient assets will be available in their jurisdiction in the event of failure of the parent bank. 
Also, a number of jurisdictions limit the types of activities that may be carried out through a 
branch structure. Branches subject to asset maintenance requirements have some of the character-
istics of separately capitalized entities. The imposition of asset maintenance requirements enables 
the local regulator to continue to allow the institution to operate in its jurisdiction when there is 
concern regarding the safety and soundness of the bank’s foreign head office. An alternative way 
to prevent any outflow of assets would be to close the branch early, but this would be feasible only 
if its soundness was in doubt. If it is solvent, the host country authorities would not have this op-
tion. 
In Canada, foreign banks have the choice of two vehicles for establishing and operating bank 
branches in Canada: a "full-service branch" or a "lending branch". As a full-service branch, the 
foreign bank will generally not be permitted to accept "retail" deposits, i.e. amounts less than 
$150,0002. Also, the deposits are not eligible for insurance. Full-service branches are required to 
provide written notice to individuals opening an account and to post notices in their branches that 
deposits with the branch are not insured by Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). A full-
service branch must also provide written notice that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI) is responsible for supervising the foreign bank branch in Canada and is not the 
primary regulator of the foreign bank. Lending branches are prohibited from accepting deposits or 
otherwise borrowing money except from financial institutions. They are required to post notices in 
their branches that they do not accept deposits from the public and that they are not members of 
CDIC. In Canada, a full-service branch of a foreign bank is generally required to maintain assets 
on deposit equal to at least 5% of branch liabilities or $5 million, whichever is greater. These must 
be deposited with a Canadian financial institution approved by the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI). A lending branch will be required to maintain assets on deposit 
equal to $100,000. The deposits must consist of cash or acceptable securities, free of any encum-
brances3. Subsequent to the commencement of operations, the Superintendent may impose more 
stringent asset maintenance requirements and order the foreign bank branch to maintain additional 
eligible assets specified as a percentage of the foreign bank branch’s liabilities.  
In the United States, some states give the state supervisor the authority to determine the asset 
maintenance ratio or to impose asset maintenance on a case by case basis. Others set the ratio by 
                                                          
1 Title 12, United States Code, section 633 (1994). 
2 Certain exceptions or "carve-outs" to this requirement are included in the Prescribed Deposits (Authorized Foreign 
Banks) Regulations. 
3 See OSFI's Guideline A-10 - Capital Equivalency Deposit for further details. 
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statute. Asset maintenance requirements may be imposed at levels in excess of total third-party 
liabilities. A foreign branch may be required to maintain a net “due to” parent position at all time1. 
In special circumstances, a state supervisor may require that the assets be placed in an account 
subject to special restrictions. These so-called asset pledge provisions, which are sometimes also 
referred to as capital equivalency deposits, require foreign bank branches and agencies to segre-
gate a certain percentage of their assets in separate accounts pledged to the state supervisor. The 
branch or agency may make limited withdrawals and transfers, but not without the knowledge or 
consent of the state supervisor. The quality of the assets eligible for the asset pledge may be higher 
and the assets themselves more liquid than assets eligible for asset maintenance. The amount of the 
pledge is typically a percentage of the “total liabilities” of the branch or agency, which include all 
liabilities either “payable at or through” the branch or reflected on the books or records of the 
branch as liabilities of that office, excluding any liabilities to others offices, agencies, branches and 
affiliates of the bank (“intragroup liabilities”). In the event of liquidation of the foreign bank, the 
pledged assets are available for liquidation expenses and to satisfy depositors or other creditors of 
the branch.  
In the European Union (EU), the introduction of the single license and abolition of the authorisa-
tion requirement for EU branches of banks established in the EU led to the abolition of endowment 
capital. EU legislation does not deal with the establishment of branches by banks from third coun-
tries. The conditions for setting up branches are determined by national law. A number of EU 
Member States maintain the requirement for endowment capital for branches from banks in third-
countries. Branches from third countries do not benefit from the single license regime. In other 
words, they cannot offer services across borders throughout the European Economic Area (EEA). 
In Germany, a branch from a non-EU country needs an initial capital of at least Euro 5 million if it 
intends to accept deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to extend credit2, otherwise 
a lesser amount will suffice, depending on the services offered3. 
In Switzerland, endowment capital is generally not required, though the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission (SFBC) can require the branch to provide a guarantee if it determines that endow-
ment capital is needed for the protection of creditors4.  
Local incorporation requirement  
A number of jurisdictions have codified requirements regarding the corporate forms of foreign 
banks where operations involve significant risk or are undertaken on a significant scale. Incorpora-
tion as separate legal entity ensures that assets and liabilities are separable from those of the for-
eign parent or head office, which is not the case with a branch. A branch is only physically but not 
legally separate from the head office and does not have its own legal personality. With a branch it 
may be difficult to determine what assets are, or would be, available in a failure to satisfy credi-
tors’ claims and which liabilities can be attributed to the branch. Assets can easily be transferred 
from the branch to the foreign head office and the management of the branch does not have a fidu-
ciary responsibility to the branch’s local clients. By contrast, local incorporation ensures that there 
is a clear delineation between the assets and liabilities of the domestic bank and those of its foreign 
parent. A locally incorporated bank has its own board of directors and those directors are required 
to act in the best interests of the company, to prevent the bank from carrying on business in a man-
ner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the bank’s creditors. It is generally held that 
these directors’ duties together with a legal entity structure provide much greater control in the 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 202-b(1) and (2) (2002) (setting forth the asset maintenance and pledge requirements for a 
New York state licensed branch).  
2 Sec. 33 (1) and section 53 (1) Gesetz über das Kreditwesen of July 10, 1961, 1961 BGBl. I 881, in the version of Sept. 9, 
1998, 1998 BGBl I 2776 as amended (Kreditwesengesetz) KWG (Banking Act). 
3 Sec. 23 (3) KWG. 
4 Art. 7 Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission on Foreign Banks in Switzerland of October 21, 1996 RS/SR 
952.111 (Foreign Banks Ordinance). 
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event of a failure and increase the likelihood that value will be retained in the local bank in the 
lead up to a failure. Some countries, such as the United States and Australia, have local depositor 
preference schemes which favour domestic depositors over foreign branch depositors1. More gen-
erally, there may be a perception that host country creditors may not be treated equitably if the 
crisis is managed from the foreign home country. In particular in case of a large bank failure, the 
fate of foreign branches may be uncertain. Laws of the home country may be rewritten under po-
litical pressure in order to give a preferred treatment to home country stakeholders. In times of 
crisis, cooperation with foreign authorities may be difficult. A cooperate home/host relationship 
requires time to develop. Yet, ownership may change. If the foreign bank is acquired by a bank 
from a third country, the counterparty for home/host coordination changes. Local incorporation 
provides more effective control in a banking crisis and enables the host country authorities to act 
more independently as would be the case with respect to branch operations.  Other reasons for 
requiring local incorporation along with the requirement to have some key operations in the host 
country may preserve jobs and protect the host country’s tax base.  
A number of jurisdictions impose a local incorporation requirement for foreign banks that want to 
operate deposit taking activities in their jurisdiction.  
In Australia, a foreign bank is not permitted to accept retail deposits, that is deposits or other funds of 
less than AUD 250,000, from individuals and non-corporate institutions. While retail deposit taking 
activities are restricted, foreign bank branches are permitted to accept deposits and other funds in any 
amount from incorporated entities and from non-residents2. They are subject to strict disclosure re-
quirements to ensure that depositors opening an account or making an initial lodgement of funds un-
derstand that the foreign bank branch is not subject to depositor protection3. Likewise in Canada, if a 
foreign bank intends to take retail deposits, it must set up a separately incorporated subsidiary. For-
eign banks wishing to engage in retail deposit-taking in the United States may do so only through an 
insured, domestically-chartered subsidiary bank4, Branches that had FDIC insurance prior to Decem-
ber 19, 1991 (the effective date of FBSEA) were grandfathered and may continue to accept retail 
deposits, but no new insured branches may be established. Foreign bank branches may accept depos-
its only in excess of $100,000 (wholesale deposits) from U.S. citizens and residents and other depos-
its as specified by the FDIC and OCC that do not require deposit insurance protection. Deposit insur-
ance is offered only to U.S.-chartered depository institutions. Some states restrict deposit-taking by 
foreign banks to non citizen non-resident deposits5.  
In New Zealand, foreign banks intending to take retail deposits6 may be required to incorporate 
locally if one of the following conditions is met7: 
(1) The foreign bank is incorporated in a jurisdiction that has legislation which gives de-
posits made, or credit conferred, in that jurisdiction a preferential claim in a winding 
up. The rationale is that it is difficult for New Zealand depositors to assess their 
likely position in a bank failure if the legislation in a foreign bank’s home jurisdic-
                                                          
1 Under the Depositor Preference Act of 1993, deposits at foreign offices of U.S. banks are subordinated to deposits at 
domestic offices and are eligible for payment only after domestic deposits have been paid in full.  
2 11E(1) Banking Act 1959. 
3 11E(2)(b) Banking Act 1959. 
4 See Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 ("FBSEA"). The FBSEA was passed as a direct reaction to the 
well-publicized improprieties of two foreign banks namely the Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") and 
Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro ("BNL"), an Italian bank. The Act gave the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve a 
more direct role in the supervision of foreign bank activity in the United States. It mandates, among other things, annual 
on-site examinations of all foreign branches and agencies and requires the approval for the establishment of any new 
branch, agency, subsidiary, or representative office.  
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 201-b (2002), N.J. State Ann. Tit. 9-B, § 1314(1); CAL. Fin. Code § 1755(b) (2002). 
6 A retail deposit-taker is defined as a financial institution that has more than $200 million retail deposits on its books in 
New Zealand. Retail deposits are defined as deposit liabilities held by natural persons, excluding liabilities with an out-
standing balance of more than $250,000. 
7 See The Banking Supervision Handbook, Statement of principles: bank registration and supervision, BS1, March 2005, 
sec. 23 et seq. 
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tion gives depositors or creditors in that country a preferential claim on assets. New 
Zealand depositors, depositors in the home jurisdiction, New Zealand creditors and 
creditors in the home jurisdiction may each have different claims on the same legal 
entity. The situation is even more complex when the legal entity has branches in 
other jurisdictions as well. In contrast to retail depositors, wholesale depositors and 
creditors, while faced with the same information gap as retail customers, are gener-
ally considered to be able to understand the deficiencies in the information disclosed 
and can take them into account when making investment decisions. Thus, foreign 
banks that deal solely with wholesale clients are not required to incorporate locally 
purely on the basis of inadequate disclosure or depositor preference legislation1.  
(2) The foreign bank’s home jurisdiction does not provide for adequate disclosure2. In 
that case, New Zealand depositors have no way to assess the financial strength of the 
foreign bank as a whole and the likelihood of the bank failing. 
(3) The foreign bank operates both as a branch and a subsidiary in New Zealand. In this 
case, the foreign banks will not be permitted to take retail deposits through the 
branch operation3. If banks with a dual registration were able to take deposits through 
both entities it is likely that depositors would be confused about which entity they 
were dealing with. The operation of a foreign bank branch in New Zealand is subject 
to the requirement that the business of the bank in New Zealand does not constitute a 
predominant proportion of the business of the global bank4.  
(4) The foreign bank is systemically important as defined by the Reserve Bank. Systemi-
cally important banks are defined as those whose New Zealand liabilities, net of 
amounts due to related parties, exceed $10 billion. The incorporation requirement 
serves to ensure that the bank can function on a stand-alone basis if the foreign par-
ent experiences difficulties. It also gives the Reserve Bank some assurance that it 
would have the ability to manage a failure affecting one of these banks5.  
Governance structures and listing requirements 
Global financial groups manage their investments globally and allocate resources across their vari-
ous subsidiaries on the basis of their assessment of the  risk/return trade-offs. These actions are 
undertaken for the benefit of the stockholders of the controlling institution. Concerns may arise 
when the actions affect domestic stakeholders, such as local depositors and authorities. For this 
reason, the governance structures of the subsidiaries should be designed to reflect the interests of 
both the parent company and the stakeholders of the subsidiary. The importance of the board and 
management looking after the interests of all the stakeholders of the financial institutions is recog-
nized under New Zealand law. Banks in New Zealand must have charters that explicitly prevent 
directors from damaging the subsidiary and its creditors in the course of pursuing the interests of 
the holding company. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand sets out this requirement explicitly when 
authorizing the purchase of Lloyd’s National Bank of New Zealand by the Australian ANZ bank-
ing group. The operation was approved subject to conditions “aimed at ensuring that local boards 
have effective operational reach over core assets and people, and the lines of responsibility and 
accountability are clear” (Bollard, 2003). Moreover, a requirement to have independent directors 
                                                          
1 Ibid., sec 35. 
2 Ibid., sec. 32. When assessing the adequacy of disclosure, the Reserve Bank will consider namely the quality of account-
ing standards used to prepare the applicant’s accounts, the frequency and timeliness of publication of the accounts, the 
quality of auditing standards used by the auditors of the applicant’s accounts, the adequate disclosure of accounting poli-
cies, the availability of both legal entity and consolidated accounts and disclosure of key indicators of financial soundness 
such as capital adequacy ratios and impaired asset data.  
3 Ibid., sec. 39. 
4 Ibid., sec. 38. 
5 Ibid, sec. 26. 
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seeks to ensure that the management of the subsidiary acts in the best interest of the local institu-
tion.  
Another approach that is used to ensure that domestic stakeholder interests are addressed is to re-
quire the domestic subsidiary to be listed on the local stock exchange. Market discipline is gener-
ally stronger when institutions are listed on a stock-exchange and subject to its disclosure require-
ments. If banks are de-listed as a result of being acquired by a foreign stockholder, this could result 
in loss of market discipline. Information disclosure will not by itself lead to more stringent market 
discipline in conditions where the lack of market-traded instruments  preclude market signals and 
the scrutiny of independent financial analysts (Cardenas et al., 2003). Even if the acquiring foreign 
bank is listed in its home market or even in the host country market, the information that it releases 
as a result may not be sufficient to assess the soundness of its subsidiary unless the latter repre-
sents a significant share of the total assets, which is rarely the case. The problems associated with 
de-listings have led authorities in some countries to persuade foreign banks to keep the shares of 
acquired institutions listed. This policy is applied in Poland (Bednarski et al., 2002) and also con-
sidered in Mexico (Majnoni et al., 2005). 
Restrictions on centralization and outsourcing arrangements 
A recent development is the trend in large banking groups to concentrate different functions, such 
as funding and liquidity management, risk management and credit decision-making to specific 
centres of competence in order to reap the benefits of specialisation and economies of scale. As a 
consequence, subsidiaries are becoming less self-contained, and it can no longer be taken for 
granted that even a large subsidiary will be able to continue its operations if the parent bank de-
faults – at least not in the short run.  
The outsourcing of operations or “offshoring” of operations beyond national borders also increases 
risk. Arrangements are sometimes entered into with unrelated parties, while in other cases the out-
sourcing firm establishes its own offshore base (i.e., through an affiliate) to provide services. Risks 
to the continued performance of the function can arise when the contractual terms and conditions 
of the outsourcing arrangement are not sufficiently clear and complete to ensure continued service 
provision under circumstances of stress of either the service provider or of the bank itself. If the 
service provider is in another jurisdiction, a risk exists that proceedings to enforce performance 
may have to be brought in that other jurisdiction’s court and under that jurisdiction’s laws. If so, 
the bank may be less able to ensure continued performance than if the provider were domestic, and 
if proceedings were handled by domestic courts and under domestic law. If the provider (or the 
provider’s ultimate parent) is regulated by a foreign regulator, there is a risk that the duties and 
powers of that regulator will cause it to intervene in such a way as to interfere with the provider’s 
performance. If the provider is also performing functions for other entities in a way in which the 
functions are operationally mingled, there is a risk of competition for the provider’s resources that 
could impede the performance of functions for the bank.  
Financial regulators in many jurisdictions have established policies on outsourcing that seek to 
ensure that the arrangements are adequately managed, and that the viability of the firm is not com-
promised1. Under the new European Market in Financial Instruments Directive, firms must not 
undertake the outsourcing of important operational functions in such a way as to impair materially 
                                                          
1 Various international bodies have issued guidance on outsourcing. These include the Joint Forum (“Outsourcing in Finan-
cial Services”, 15 February 2005), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published its Princi-
ples on Outsourcing of Financial Services for Market Intermediaries (“Outsourcing Principles” of 15 February 2005), the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) (CP 02 30th April 2004 “The High Level Principles on Outsourc-
ing”) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) which published advice on the implementation of EU 
legislation on outsourcing within the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID).  
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the quality of its internal control and the ability of the supervisor to monitor the firm's compliance 
with all obligations1. 
Some jurisdictions have gone a step further and imposed restrictions on the centralisation of func-
tions or the outsourcing of activities in foreign jurisdiction in order to ensure that the continued 
operation of core functions that are crucial for the a financial system and the wider economy as a 
whole are not compromised.  
In New Zealand, for instance, the Reserve Bank places specific obligations on bank boards to en-
sure that they retain sufficient control of outsourced functions, while providing flexibility in the 
means by which a bank may meet the policy's requirements (Bollard, 2004). The policy is framed 
in terms of the continuity of bank functions and the provision of core services. In the event of a 
failure of a bank or a service provider to a bank, these functions must be continued without mate-
rial interruption in order to avoid significant damage to the financial system.  
The banks are required to have a legal and practical ability to control and execute any business, 
and any functions relating to any business, of the bank that are carried on by a person other than 
the bank. Whereas the ability to control and execute a function refers to the ability to invoke statu-
tory, contractual or other rights to ensure that the function continues to be provided, the practical 
ability to control and execute a function refers to the ability to secure continued provision of the 
function, taking into account any delays associated with the enforcement of legal rights, the avail-
ability and responsiveness of personnel with the necessary technical and business knowledge and 
physical access to and control of the required systems and data. More specifically, banks are re-
quired to ensure that under normal business conditions and in the event of stress or failure of the 
bank or of a service provider to the bank  
(1) the bank’s clearing and settlement obligations due on a day can be met on that day; 
financial risk positions on a day can be identified on that day;  
(2) financial risk positions can be monitored and managed on the day following any fail-
ure and on subsequent days; and  
(3) existing customers can be given access to payments facilities on the day following 
any failure and on subsequent days.  
In addition, banks whose New Zealand liabilities, net of amounts due to related parties, exceed $10 
billion (Large Banks) are subject to a condition of registration relating to outsourcing arrange-
ments2. They also must ensure that  
(1) the management of the bank by its chief executive officer or person in an equivalent 
position (together “CEO”) be carried out solely under the direction and supervision 
of the board of directors of the bank;  
(2) the employment contract of the CEO of the bank is with the bank. The terms and 
conditions of the CEO’s employment agreement must be determined by, and any de-
cision relating to the employment or termination of employment of the CEO must be 
made by the board of directors of the bank; and  
(3) all staff employed by the bank shall have their remuneration determined by (or under 
the delegated authority of) the board of directors or the CEO of the bank and are ac-
countable (directly or indirectly) solely to the CEO of the bank.  
In Poland, subsidiaries of a foreign financial group play a significant role although they present 
only a fraction of the parent’s balance sheet (Bednarski et al., 2002). The National Bank attempts 
to address the problem arising from the asymmetric relations between the parent bank and Polish 
subsidiary by applying the “stand alone principle” that is requiring that systemic foreign subsidiar-
ies be able to operate on a stand-alone basis (Bielicki, 2005). This principle translates into the re-
                                                          
1 Art. 13 of the Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in finan-
cial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive). 
2 See Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Financial Stability Department Document BS1, Outsourcing Policy, October 2005. 
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quirement that management in all areas should be in the hands of the local management board. 
Besides group-wide risk management, local risk management must be in place with the necessary 
resources and expertise available at the local level.  
When imposing restrictions on centralization and outsourcing it is necessary to carefully weigh the 
gain in efficiency against greater dependency on foreign operations and the risk of failure. 
Requiring major financial institutions to operate on a stand-alone basis may significantly reduce 
banking efficiency to the extent that it forces them to rely on more costly and less expert in-house 
resources. On the positive side, outsourcing can reduce the probability of failure through 
diversification and access to greater expertise and capital.  
Ex post remedies – the separate entity approach 
In some jurisdictions, a carving out of domestic operations and assets from a distressed foreign 
bank may only take place in an insolvency scenario. Under this so-called separate entity approach, 
branch operations that normally form an inseparable part of the foreign head office are treated as if 
they were separately incorporated (Baxter, 2004). If the host country is able to detach the local 
branch from the larger bank in a crisis situation, it will be able to assume control of all domestic 
operations as in the case of local incorporation discussed earlier. Such an approach may give rise 
to conflict and a regulatory run on the assets to be assigned to the branch. The host country may 
seek to take a larger share of the global bank’s capital whereas the home country may seek to 
transfer assets from the branch to the parent balance sheet.  
In Canada, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is authorized to seize 
all of the assets of the foreign bank in Canada. These assets can be used to satisfy the claims of 
depositors and creditors of the foreign bank branch in Canada. If these assets are not sufficient to 
reimburse depositors and creditors of the Canadian branch, they could seek recourse from the liq-
uidator of the foreign bank in the home jurisdiction.  
In the United States, some state laws provide for the taking of possession of the branch located in 
that state1. An amendment to the Bankruptcy Code that became effective on October 17, 2005 ex-
plicitly preserves the ability to conduct a separate liquidation2. Others allow the state supervisor to 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 487.15103 (2002). 
2 Pursuant to Section 1501(c)(1) and 109(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act foreign banks may file under chapter 15 only if 
they do not have a branch or agency in the United States. Foreign insurance companies, by contrast, are permitted to com-
mence chapter 15 proceedings apparently without limitation. These provisions were introduced with the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention Consumer Protection Act of 2005 following the “Yugo case” which had giving rise to concerns over the legality 
of  ring fencing and the conduct of a "local liquidation". The foreign liquidating agency in of Jugobanka sought to use 
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code that permits the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts to grant assistance to worldwide proceedings. 
The case stems from a 1992 order by the first President Bush freezing assets of Yugoslav-owned banks in connection with 
the Balkans crisis. Jugobanka, which rented 30,000 square feet at 437 Madison Avenue in Manhattan owned by Sage Re-
alty eventually stopped paying rent.  While Sage won a ruling in seeking about US$4 million in rent and interest in Ameri-
can federal courts, Jugobanka sought bankruptcy relief in Serbia. Judge Blackshear ruled that Jugobanka did not have 
standing to repatriate the assets to Serbia and that no jurisdiction here permitted that. Judge Rakoff -- who as a district 
judge hears appeals from Bankruptcy Court -- reversed Judge Blackshear, and said Jugobanka had the right to make that 
argument before Judge Blackshear. See In re Agency for Deposit Ins. Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks 
v. Superintendent of Banks of New York, 313 B.R. 561, 564 n.1 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (“without section 304 relief, the foreign 
bank’s U.S. assets are subject to control of state banking regulators who likely will “funnel the assets of failed U.S. 
branches of foreign banks to domestic creditors in preference to foreign creditors”). The regulators asked Judge Rakoff to 
reconsider his decision, arguing that it threatens to legitimize Jugobanka's attempt to take those assets offshore to Yugosla-
via, beyond the reach of state banking laws and regulators. Conference of State Bank Supervisors president Neil Milner  
wrote, "…the  states' banking regulators have the sole authority to  liquidate the assets of an insolvent state-licensed for-
eign bank for distribution to creditors of the bank's branch or agency. We write to point out that the Court's interpretation 
of Section 304, as applied in this context, is unprecedented and brings the Bankruptcy Code -- which ordinarily would not 
apply to these institutions -- into irreconcilable conflict with state bank insolvency laws. The Court's application of Section 
304 would alter fundamentally how state-licensed foreign banks are regulated. The purpose of state licensing and supervi-
sion is to protect the creditors who do business with state-licensed foreign entities. Expatriating the assets to a foreign 
proceeding would defeat this." The amendment to the Bankruptcy Code resolves the issue in favour of the interpretation of 
the bank supervisors.  
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take possession of all of the assets of the foreign bank located in that state1. Under the New York 
Banking Law, for example, the Superintendent of Banks can take title not only to the assets of the 
branch wherever located, but also to all assets of the foreign bank located in New York2. Given 
New York’s position as an international financial centre, the foreign bank may indeed have sub-
stantial assets in New York, such as correspondent bank accounts established by other branches of 
the foreign bank, title to which vests in the Superintendent when the Superintendent takes posses-
sion of the branch3. The payment of claims against the branch is usually limited to third party 
claimants having a transaction with the branch or agency and excludes subsidiaries, affiliates or 
other offices of the foreign bank4. With court approval, the state supervisor may compromise debts 
and sell property. Some state statutes specifically provide for the adoption or the rejection of con-
tracts, such as leases and other executory contracts. Some incorporate explicit statutory protection 
for multi-branch close-out netting. As such, New York banking law provides that, following ter-
mination of a multi-branch master agreement, the single net termination amount is calculated on 
both a global and New York-branch only basis5. The Superintendent of Banks, as receiver of the 
branch, is only liable to pay to a non-defaulting party the lesser of the two amounts. Some states 
permit the state regulator to recover any transfers made by the branch in contemplation of insol-
vency6 or void such transfers7. Some states also provide for an automatic stay of all actions brought 
against the foreign bank branch8. When the liquidation of the branch is complete, the residue is 
transferred to the foreign bank. If the bank has another office or offices in the United States and if 
the assets of those offices appear to be insufficient to pay creditors in full, the court may order the 
state regulator to transfer funds to cover the insufficiency9.  
In New Zealand, a foreign bank branch can be converted into a subsidiary in order to ring fence its 
operation from distress at its head office. Under Section 117 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Act, the Reserve Bank can recommend to the Minister that a bank be placed under statutory man-
agement where there is a threat of insolvency. A statutory manager has wide powers, including the 
power to suspend payment of money owing and the power to convert a branch of a foreign bank 
into a locally incorporated entity10. 
Resolution of foreign-owned bank insolvencies  
Difficulties with the efficient resolution of foreign-owned bank insolvencies arise from inherent 
incentives of regulators to favour the welfare of their domestic jurisdiction at the expense of the 
foreign home or host country. Bank failures are managed on a national level and in the national 
interest. Coordination and cooperation among home and host countries are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to solve the problem (Hüpkes, 2005). What appears to be required is greater 
harmonization and homogeneity, particularly of closure policies and claims resolution. Indeed, 
multinational regimes that are standardized in terms of both provisions and enforcement, can be 
seen as a desirable way to ensure that bank failures are resolved efficiently and in an equitable 
manner (Ingves, 2006). But there are many challenges in putting such a system in place so that it is 
unlikely that a single, multinational structure, even if it was limited to only the world’s largest 
banks, will be adopted in the near future. In the meantime, how should cross border banking be 
operated? Until a satisfactory solution to the problem can be developed, it appears to be in the best 
                                                          
1 See., e.g., Cal. Fin. Code § 1785 (2002).  
2 N.Y. Banking Law, § 606(4)(a) (2002).  
3 N.Y. Banking Law, § 606(4)(a) (2002). 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 606(4)(a) (2002).  
5 The “global net amount is the amount owed by or to the non-U.S. bank as a whole if all transactions across all branches 
subject to the multi-branch netting agreement are considered. The “New York or local branch net amount” is the amount 
owed by or to the non-U.S. bank after netting only the transactions entered into by the New York branch. 
6 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 7-1-157(b) (2002). 
7 See, e.g., Con.. Gen. Stat. § 36a-235 (2002). 
8 See., e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 619 (2002).  
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 606(4)(b) (2002).  
10 Sec. 140 Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act. 
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interest of countries to devise a regulatory framework governing physical cross border banking 
presence that reduces the problems arising from financial failures in a cross-border context.  
References 
1. Baxter, Thomas C., Joyce M. Hansen and Joseph H. Sommer, 2004, “Two Cheers for Territo-
riality: An Essay on International Bank Insolvency Law”, The American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal, Vol. 78. 
2. Bednarski, Piotr and Jacek Osinski (2002), “Financial sector issues in Poland”, in Financial 
sector in EU accession countries, Christian Thiman (Ed.). European Central Bank, Frankfurt, 
Germany. 
3. Bielicki, Grzegorz, 2005, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Cross-border Bank-
ing Conference, October 6-7, 2005. 
4. Bollard, Alan, 2003, “After the National Bank acquisition: living with big Australian banks”, 
Speech to the Australasian Institute of Banking and Finance. November 6, 2003.  
5. ___, 2004, “Being a responsible host – supervising foreign owned banks”, Address to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference: Systemic Financial Crises – Resolving Large 
Bank Insolvencies, BIS Review 55/2004.  
6. Cardenas, Juan, Juan Pablo Graf, and Pascual O’Dogherty, 2003, “Foreign bank entry in 
emerging market economies: a host country perspective”, Committee on the Global Financial 
System, Working Paper.  
7. Caviglia, G., G. Krause and C.Thimann, 2002, “Key features of the financial sectors in EU 
accession countries”, Bednarski, Piotr and Jacek Osinski (2002), “Financial sector issues in 
Poland”, in Financial sector in EU accession countries, Christian Thiman (Ed.). European 
Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany.  
8. Cerutti, Eugenio, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Maria Soledad Martínez Pería, 2005, “How 
Banks Go Abroad: Branches or Subsidiaries?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3753. 
9. Claessens, Stijn, 2006, “Competitive Implications of Cross-border Banking”, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 3854. 
10. Committee on the Global Financial System CGFS, 2004, Foreign direct investment in the fi-
nancial sector of emerging market economies CGFS Publications No. 22, March 2004. 
11. Del Negro, Marco and Stephen J. Kay (2002). “Global banks, local crises: Bad news from 
Argentina”. Economic Review, Third quarter, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
12. Hull, Leslie (2002). “Foreign-owned banks: Implications for New Zealand’s financial stabil-
ity”, Discussion Paper 2002/05. New Zealand. 
13. Hüpkes, Eva, 2005, “Too big to save” -– towards a functional approach to resolving crises in 
global financial institutions”, in: Systemic Financial Crisis: Resolving Large Bank Insolven-
cies, Douglas Evanoff and George Kaufman (eds.), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 
2005.  
14. Ingves, Stefan, 2006, “Cross-border banking regulation – a way forward: the European case”, 
Speech at the Conference on International Financial Instability: Cross-Border Banking and 
National Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, 16 October 2006, BIS Re-
view 96/2006.   
15. Majnoni, Giovanni and Andrew Powell, 2005 Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago Cross-border Banking Conference, October 6-7, 2005. 
16. McCauley, Robert N; Judith S. Ruud and Philip D. Wooldridge (2002). “Globalising interna-
tional banking”, in BIS Quarterly Review, March 2002, pages 41-51. Basel, Switzerland. 
 
